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ABSTRACT 
The existence and the magnitude of the value of corporate control have been 
broadly debated in the literature, but few of them address China. The existing studies 
follow two routes: calculate the value of corporate control from dual class share 
prices or from a comparison of the transfer prices of controlling block shares and 
non-controlling shares. However, in almost all the studies adopting the latter 
approach, the research design cannot address the impact of liquidity effect well. This 
potentially makes the estimation of the value of corporate control misleading. Major 
shareholders of Chinese companies usually hold illiquid non-tradable shares; and 
their block shareholdings are sometimes transferred to other parties. The special 
feature of the Chinese stock market in the dichotomy of tradable and non-tradable 
shares provides a unique setting to study the value of corporate control with the 
liquidity effect separated out. 
In this thesis, we analyze the value of corporate control in China by using 95 
block transfers during 1999 to 2004. Similar to the previous research, we found that 
there exists a positive premium of corporate control in China. Control block 
transactions in China are priced 14% higher than non-control block transactions on 
average. Cross-sectional regression analysis shows that the value of corporate control 
in China varies positively with the largest shareholder's controlling power. The block 
acquirers are also paying a higher price for companies located in poorly-govemed 
regions or having poor corporate governance practices. Similar to the case in Poland, 
control premium in China is higher in companies with relatively poor performance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The value of corporate control has been broadly debated in the corporate 
finance literature. Traditional finance theory suggests that shareholders receive 
benefits in proportion to their fractional ownership, and in this sense, there should 
not be any additional value for having the controlling power of a corporation. 
However, modem studies show that some controlling shareholders are willing to pay 
a control premium for the controlling power. It is generally agreed in the literature 
that the control premium is associated with the private benefits of control. 
Various studies in the corporate finance literature discuss private benefits of 
control and identify different forms of it. Jensen and Meckling (1976) link the private 
benefits with the perquisites enjoyed by the top executives. Harris and Raviv (1988) 
and Aghion and Bolton (1992) reveal that some shareholders achieve private benefits 
of control because they enjoy the pleasure of commanding a corporation. Johnson et 
al. (2000) provide empirical evidence that controlling shareholders can extract 
private benefits by tunneling - the diversion of corporate resources from the 
corporation (or its minority shareholders) to the controlling shareholder. 
However, controlling power also comes with private costs, and in some cases, 
it can make the net private benefits negative (Barclay and Holdemess, 1989). One of 
the major sources of the private cost comes from an under-diversified portfolio. The 
largest shareholder often holds a controlling block of shares and makes itself under-
diversified. Liquidity cost of holding block shares can also decrease the control 
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premium observed as block shares being less liquid. Other private costs include the 
potential legal liability incurred as well as the risk of reputation loss. 
Private benefits of control are difficult to observe and measure directly. A 
controlling party will only extract private benefits from corporate resources if and 
only if it is difficult to verify and prove (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Two major 
methods have been widely used to quantify value of corporate control. The first 
method uses firms with multiple classes of shares having different voting rights. 
Then, the value of corporate control can be easily quantified by observing the market 
price differences between shares with different voting rights (Lease et al, 1983， 
Zingales, 1994，Nenova, 2003). The second method, introduced by Barclay and 
Holdemess (1989), quantify the value of corporate control as the differences between 
the price of controlling block share transfers and the market exchange price, and 
infer it as the private benefits of control. 
The value of corporate control varies among studies. Barclay and Holdemess 
(1989) analyze the pricing of 63 block trades between 1978 and 1982 and find that 
block trades are priced, on average, 20% higher than the post-announcement 
exchange prices. Nenova (2003) uses a sample of 661 dual-class firms in 18 
countries in 1997 and documents that the premium of control-block varies from 
around 0% in Finland to around 50% in South Korea. Dyck and Zingales (2004) use 
393 control transactions in 39 countries between 1990 and 2000 and find that the 
average value of corporate control is 14%, with a range from -4% in Japan to 65% in 
Brazil. 
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Although there are a vast number of studies about the value of corporate 
control, few of them address China. As a rising economic power, China restored its 
stock market at the end of 1990 and it is still on the way to match the rules and 
regulations of the stock markets with those of developed financial markets. At the 
moment, stocks in China are typically dichotomized into tradable liquid shares and 
non-tradable illiquid shares. Two types of share are identical in every aspect, except 
that those illiquid shares cannot be sold in the secondary market. 
This thesis studies the value of corporate control in China's listed companies. 
The prevailing approaches to the estimation of value of corporate control are either 
measuring the price difference between voting shares and non-voting shares or 
estimating the price difference between block share transfers and market price of 
stocks. However, both approaches involve inherent weakness. First, the price 
premium of voting shares over non-voting shares does not necessarily incorporate 
corporate control rights based on block share ownership. Second, in almost all other 
economies, the premium of block share transfer price over stock market price 
involves the effect of liquidity in selling block shares. In contrast, the majority of 
shares in China's listed companies, namely state-owned shares and legal person 
shares, are non-tradable and thus illiquid. In this thesis, we compare the transfer 
prices of block share transfers leading to largest shareholder change and those of 
transfers not doing so in China's listed companies to compute the value of corporate 
control. This could most accurately reflect the value of corporate control right by 
overcoming the shortcomings of the prevailing two approaches in the literature. 
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In this thesis, we analyze block transfer cases of Chinese companies between 
1999 and 2004. We discriminate those cases into two types, cases which are 
associated with control transaction and cases which are not. We match each block 
transfer, which is associated with control transaction, with another block transfer of 
the same company, which does not involve control transaction, in order to investigate 
the value of corporate control. During the five years time-span, 95 block transfer 
pairs from 76 companies are identified. 
We basically follow the rationale pioneered by Barclay and Holderaess (1989) 
to test the existence and magnitude of control premium in China. It is observed that 
controlling block (block transfers that associated with control transaction) in China 
are, on average, priced 14% higher than non-controlling block (block transfers that 
do not involve with control transaction). Multivariate regression analysis reveals that 
the value of corporate control increases with the controlling power of the block 
acquirer and decreases with the profitability of the target firm. The control premium 
will also decrease if the target company is located in regions with better regional 
governance while it will increase if the target company has poor corporate 
governance practices. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews 
the relevant literature about value of corporate control and private benefits. The main 
hypotheses are derived in Section 3. We describe the methodology and data in 
Section 4 and Section 5 respectively. Section 6 outlines the empirical results of 
statistical tests. We will summarize the findings and conclude the thesis in Section 7. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Traditional finance theory assumes that ownership of publicly traded 
companies is diffuse and there is a separation between ownership and control. 
Corporate decisions are made by professional managers who proposed to act in the 
interest of the diffuse shareholders. However, research has shown that a number of 
public corporations have large block shareholders, which influence the management 
structure and have the ownership and controlling power simultaneously. It is also 
found that those cases are not limited to a few small firms, but also exist in large and 
well-known corporations. 
Block shareholdings are sometimes transferred and it had become the focus 
of some research in corporate finance. Throughout the literature, it is observed that 
some block-share buyers are willing to pay a control premium for acquiring the 
controlling power, and it is usually associated with the private benefits of corporate 
control. 
Barclay and Holderness (1989) analyze the pricing of 63 block trades 
between 1978 and 1982 in United States. They find that the blocks are typically 
priced at a substantial premium relative to the post-announcement exchange price, 
with an average of 20%. They also perform multivariate regression analysis to 
identify the determinants of block premium. It is found that the premium increases at 
a decreasing rate with firm size and at an increasing rate with fractional ownership. 
Better prior trade performance also increases the control premium. The authors also 
found that the premium differs between individual and corporate buyers, apparently 
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because of individuals' limited capital and risk aversion. Individuals are willing to 
pay a larger premium if the target firm is more leveraged, has a lower stock-return 
variance or with a larger balance of cash and marketable securities at the time of 
trade. 
Nicodano and Sembenelli (2000) analyze 94 block transactions from 64 
manufacturing companies in Italy between 1987 and 1992. The average premium of 
the block transfers is 27.4% when compared with the post-transaction market price. 
The authors dichotomize the sample into two sub-samples according to the block size 
and found that the premium is larger when a larger size of block shares is traded. 
Company's net worth as well as the existence of non-voting equity also has a 
significant positive relationship with the premium. 
Trojanowski (2003) analyzes 53 block trades during 1996-2000 in Poland and 
contributes to one of the few block premium analyses in the emerging markets. 
Although block premium is expected to be high in emerging markets because the 
financial system is weaker and it is easier to extract private benefits in emerging 
market, the result is reversed. The observed block transfers are priced, on average, 
6.8% above the post-trade exchange price which is relatively lower than that in other 
countries. The author argued that the presence of liquidity costs faced by block 
holders may decrease the private benefits of holding equity blocks. 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) perform international comparisons about the value 
of corporate control. Using 393 control transaction cases between 1990 and 2000 in 
39 countries, they find the average value of corporate control is around 14%, ranging 
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from -4% to 65% in different countries. They find that lower private benefits of 
control are associated with better accounting standards, better legal protection of 
minority shareholders as well as better law enforcement. A high level of press 
diffusion, a high rate of tax compliance as well as more intense product market 
competition will also decrease the value of corporate control. As different countries 
have different levels of financial development, the authors also test several 
theoretical propositions about the effects between private benefits of control and the 
development of financial markets. Their results align with major theoretical 
propositions that higher private benefits of control are associated with less developed 
capital markets, more concentrated ownership and privately negotiated privatizations. 
Massari et al. (2006) extend the Barclay and Holdemess (1989) approach to 
study the control premium in Italy, in which transfer of control is regulated by law. 
They analyze the pricing of 27 control transactions in Italy between 1993 and 2003. 
It is found that the average control premium is around 8%. The authors also 
investigate the cross-sectional variation of the control premium and find that the 
value of corporate control varies positively with the target firm's degree of stock-
pyramiding, and negatively with the target firm's size. It is also found that the 
control premium tends to be larger when the acquirer is a strategic buyer as opposed 
to a financial buyer. 
Apart from using the method pioneered by Barclay and Holdemess (1989) 
which focuses on the transfer of controlling blocks in publicly traded companies, 
there are also a vast amount of literature makes use of companies with multiple 
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classes of shares that have different voting rights to analyze the value of corporate 
control. 
Lease et al. (1983) analyze 30 publicly-traded corporations that have two 
classes of common stock between 1940 and 1978. The two classes of stock are 
identical except having different voting abilities. Four corporations in the sample 
also have outstanding voting preferred stocks. For the 26 firms that have two classes 
of common stock outstanding, the authors find that common stock with superior 
voting rights are traded at an average premium of 5.44%, while the 4 firms that have 
an additional class of voting preferred stocks, the result reverses and records an 
1.25% discount. The authors explain the results by suggesting that there are both 
costs and benefits of corporate control, and the price differences may reflect unequal 
indirect cash or non-cash payoffs to different shareholders. 
Megginson (1990) examines 152 British firms that have two or more 
common share classes with different voting rights between 1955 and 1982. With 
more than 16,000 monthly price pairs, the author finds that the superior voting shares 
are having a premium of 13.3% over the restricted voting shares. The author also 
provides regression analysis to analyze the determinants of the voting premium. It is 
found that the voting premium is increased with insider holdings of superior voting 
shares and decreased with insider holdings of restricted voting shares, while other 
variables like total asset value are not significant. 
Zingales (1994) analyzes all the companies having both voting and nonvoting 
shares traded on the Milan Stock Exchange (MSE) between 1987 and 1990. 96 
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companies having dual-class shares are observed and the average premium of voting 
right is 82%. The result is far larger than other studies, and the author argues that 
private benefits are particularily large in Italy while the competition for control is 
also particularly intense. It also provides an alert that careful comparison is needed 
when we try to compare the value of corporate control across different financial 
systems. 
Nenova (2003) measures the value of corporate voting rights by using 661 
dual-class firms in 18 countries in 1997. The average value of corporate control-
block votes varies greatly across countries, from -3% in Hong Kong to 48% in South 
Korea. The author also finds that there is a negative and significant relationship 
between the value of corporate control and tougher rule of law, stricter general 
investor protection laws, stricter investor-friendly takeover laws, and the absence of 
power-concentrating charter provisions. 
Table 1 summarizes different studies on control premium and private benefit 
measures. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
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3. Research Hypothesis 
3.1 Institutional setting 
As a part of China's economic reform, China re-started its stock market in 
late 1990 in Shanghai and early 1991 in Shenzhen. After 17 years of development, 
there are already 1472 listed companies in the two exchanges that contribute a total 
of RMB 16 trillion (about $2.1 trillion) market capitalization in April 2007. However, 
among the RMB 16 trillion market capitalization, the tradable shares valued only 5.2 
trillion which account for around one-third of the total market capitalization.' 
Prior to the opening of the two Stock Exchanges, China converted many 
state-owned enterprises into stock companies. However, concerns are raised about 
the potential loss of state assets if all the shares of state-owned enterprises are freely-
traded. As a result, the ownership structure of a typical listed company in China is 
separated into three classes: state-owned shares, restricted institutional shares and 
common shares. Both the state-owned shares and restricted institutional shares are 
non-tradable in the market while the general public can only trade the common A-
and B-share in the stock exchange. Among the three classes of shares, holders are 
entitled with the same cash flow and voting power. The only difference between 
different classes of shares is the transferability. Both state-owned shares and 
restricted institutional shares can only be transferred through private placement and 
auction between corporate and legal-entity institutions. A-shares are freely tradable 
for domestic investors on the stock exchanges while B-shares are only tradable by 
foreign investors who use either U.S. dollars or Hong Kong dollars for settlement. 
‘Source: The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, wwvv.csrs.aov.cn 
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Consistent with previous literature, Chen and Xiong (2001) find that there 
exist illiquidity discounts for the non-tradable shares in China. The authors make use 
of restricted institutional shares transaction data from August 2000 to July 2001 and 
find that the average discount for restricted institutional shares is 77.93% on auction 
transfers and 85.59% on private transfers, compared with their common share 
counterparts. 
3.2 Existence and magnitude of the value of corporate control 
In this thesis, we basically follow the method pioneered by Barclay and 
Holdemess (1989). Different from the voting right approach which compares the 
stock price of shares with different voting power, Barclay and Holdemess (1989) 
make use of large percentage block share transfer and compare the block trade price 
with the post-announcement exchange price. They argue that the difference 
represents the private benefits of control from block ownership. 
However, almost all block trades that happened in China involve illiquid 
state-owned shares or restricted institutional shares. The illiquidity as well as the 
large discount of those non-tradable shares makes direct employment of the Barclay 
and Holdemess (1989) method impossible. Aligned with their rationale, we use two 
separate block transactions within the same company, in which one of them involves 
control transfer and the other did not. We then normalize the block transfer prices 
with the market exchange prices. We infer the difference between the two prices as 
the value of corporate control in China. Detailed methodology employed is discussed 
in Section 4. 
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The unique ownership structure of Chinese listed companies provides an 
excellent setting to analyze the value of corporate control. Trojanowski (2003) 
argues that the liquidity cost of holding equity blocks decreases the value of 
corporate control observed in Poland, despite numerous deficiencies in corporate 
governance standards in that emerging country. The existence of liquidity effect can 
make the estimation of the value of corporate control misleading. Liquidity costs of 
holding block shares differ in difference countries and the problem enlarges in 
emerging markets. Different shareholding levels will also incur different liquidity 
costs which make direct comparison between block transfer prices and market 
exchange prices prone to error. By comparing two illiquid block share transfers in 
China, we can obtain a clean control premium without the contamination of the 
liquidity effect, and provide a unique measure of the value of corporate control with 
the liquidity effect separated out. 
In this thesis, we make use of China's unique ownership structure to analyze 
the value of corporate control in China, with the liquidity effect minimized. Similar 
to previous studies, we expect there exist a positive value of corporate control in 
Chinese firms, as block acquirers may be willing to pay a premium for acquiring 
controlling blocks in order to enjoy the controlling power or extract the private 
benefits of control. And it forms our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A positive value of corporate control is observed in the Chinese 
market while the liquidity effect is minimized. 
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3.3 Determinants of the value of corporate control 
Apart from checking the existence and magnitude of control premium, we are 
also interested in the determinants of the value of corporate control. Previous studies 
show that there is a wide fluctuation of block premium between different companies, 
and we would like to identify the factors which would affect the value of corporate 
control in China and analyze their effects on it. 
We believe that the value of corporate control in China can be affected by 
four main types of factors: controlling power, regional governance, corporate 
governance and firm-specific performance. 
Block size varies while company ownership concentration also differs 
between companies. It is likely that the block acquirer would be willing to pay a 
higher premium if the block is large enough for it to exercise its controlling power. 
So, we hypothesize that the higher controllability the acquirer has, the easier for it to 
extract private benefits from the target company, which results in a higher control 
premium observed during block transfers. 
Hypothesis 2: The value of corporate control in China varies positively with the 
controlling power that the block buyer acquired. 
Despite the rapid market-oriented economic development in China, regional 
disparity exists and grows continuously. More developed regions like Shanghai and 
Guangdong achieved great economic development and have a relatively open and 
free economy. The level of government involvement or intervention in these regions 
13 
is relatively minimal when compared to the inner and western part of China, where 
the marketization progress is still very slow. Marketization progress in China helps to 
improve regional governance and provides a fair investment environment to potential 
investors. However, better regional governance may also hammer the potential 
private benefits extracted, and it may effectively decrease the control premium. Thus, 
it forms our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The value of corporate control in China varies negatively with 
different locations ‘ regional governance level. 
Besides the macro-level regional governance, we also believe that the micro-
level corporate governance will also play a role in determining the value of corporate 
control. Earlier studies show that general investors and market practitioners are 
willing to pay a premium to well-governed firms so that their interests will not be 
eroded by the management or executives. However, senior management or corporate 
owner can extract private benefits of corporate control through tunneling more easily 
if the company is weakly-govemed. So, we believe that weaker corporate governance 
of the target firm will increase the control premium, and it forms our fourth 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The value of corporate control in China varies negatively with 
different companies ‘ corporate governance quality. 
Apart from controlling power, regional and corporate governance, firm 
performance would also affect the value of corporate control. The effect of a target 
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firm's profitability on the value of corporate control varies across different studies. 
Dyck and Zingales (2002) find that there exist a positive relationship between firm 
performance and the value of corporate control during their international analysis, 
while Trojanowski (2003) rejects this finding in the Polish data and finds that the 
relationship is negative. Trojanowski (2003) argues that the possibilities to extract 
private benefits of control in poorly performing companies are higher than in well-
performing companies in Poland. We believe that China's case may be more similar 
to those in Poland which both are on the track of economic transition towards a 
market economy. The ability of corporate owners to extract private benefits may be 
higher in poorly performing firms in China and thus, it forms our fifth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: The value of corporate control in China varies negatively with target 
firm 's performance. 
This thesis plans to investigate these five hypotheses. The following sections 
of the thesis will discuss the methodology and data employed for the empirical 
testing of these hypotheses. 
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Testing the existence of value of corporate control 
As discussed in hypothesis setting, this thesis tests the value of corporate 
control in China using the rationale pioneered by Barclay and Holdemess (1989). 
However, direct application of their methodology is impossible in China because of 
the illiquidity and discount observed in non-tradable shares. 
Barclay and Holdemess (1989) make use of the simple observation that 
differences exist between block exchange prices and the market prices traded in the 
stock exchange. They compare the block exchange prices with the post-
announcement exchange prices and infer the differences as the value of private 
benefits of control. 
Price premium = ^^^ ，^  
The comparison is intuitive and easy to understand, but cannot directly apply 
to China's case. Almost all block-share transfers in China involve non-tradable 
illiquid state-owned shares or restricted institutional shares which are traded at a 
large discount in negotiation-based block transfers when compared to the trading 
prices. This makes direct comparison between block-transfer prices and market 
exchange prices impossible. 
To compute the value of corporate control in China, we make use of two 
block-share transfers within the same company, one of which leads to controlling 
2 Pb is the block-trade price and P � i s the post-announcement exchange price 
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shareholder change (referred as control block transfer) while another does not 
(referred as non-control block transfer). Since block shares are illiquid and not 
publicly transferable, we can minimize the liquidity cost problem encountered by 
previous studies and provide a clean measure of control premium. 
As time differences often exist between control block transfers and non-
control block transfers, we normalize the observed block exchange prices by the 
post-announcement market exchange prices so as to do the comparison. This can 
control the variables that vary across time as block shares and shares traded in the 
stock exchange are only differed by the transferability. We call this measure of value 
of corporate control as normalized control premium. 
P� P；' i f c 
Normalized control premium = (—^——hr^^^W, 
P� P� P� 
We match each control block transfer with non-control block transfer and 
compute the normalized control premium. In cases there exist more than one 
matching available, we would use the pair that have the shortest time difference 
between exchanges. This methodology aligns with the fundamental thinking of 
Barclay and Holdemess (1989) and helps us to investigate the existence and 
magnitude of the value of corporate control in China while minimizing the liquidity 
problem faced by previous studies. 
4.2 Typical Examples 
3 pC is the control-block exchange price, P^e jg the non-control block exchange price, pM is the market 
exchange price while the underscripts represent the time. 
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To better illustrate the usage of the normalized control premium, looking into 
some typical examples in our sample may be insightful. As discussed before, this 
thesis makes use of block transfers in China which involve control transaction. We 
interpret the value of corporate control as the price difference between control block 
transfer and non-control block transfer and investigate the existence, magnitude and 
determinants of the control premium. 
Shijianzhuang Quanyechang Company Limited (石家莊勸業場股份有限公 
司，stock code 600892) is one of the typical examples of our sample companies. 
Listed in Shanghai, the company had two block transfers in the spring of 2000. On 
23rd March 2000, Baiquan Group Company of Hunan University (湖南大學百泉集 
團公司)，which previously held no interest in Shijianzhuang Quanyechang, acquired 
29.56% shares of the captioned company. This block transfer, valued at RMB 2 per 
share, helps the subsidiary of Hunan University to become the largest shareholder of 
Shijianzhuang Quanyechang while the seller of the block no longer holds any share 
of the company. We identify this block transfer as a control block transfer because 
the buyer of the block becomes the largest shareholder of the target company after 
the transfer. 
A month later, on 26''' April 2000, a company from Guizhou (貴州匯龄實業 
有限公司）bought another block of shares in Shijianzhuang Quanyechang. 9.67% of 
the total shares were transferred at the price of RMB 1.2 per share, and the acquirer 
became the second largest shareholder effectively. We identify this block transfer as 
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a non-control block transfer as the buyer of the block has not become the largest 
shareholder of the target company after the transfer. 
It is easy to observe that, in this example, the control block is priced much 
higher than the non-control block (more than 60%). Such a comparison is intuitive 
and easy to understand but prone to the fundamental value change of the target 
company in the period between the two block transfers. The comparison may yield a 
wrong conclusion and will not be effective as the time difference between the two 
block transfers lengthened. So, as introduced in the methodology section, we make 
use of the market trading price to normalize the block transfer price before making 
the comparison. This method aligns with the fundamental thinking of the previous 
literature while taking the special feature of China's stock market into account. We 
will discuss this method in the next example. 
Shashi Power28 Company Limited (沙市活力二八股份有限公司，stock 
code 600703), listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange, experienced two block-share 
transactions in 2000 and 2003 respectively. On August 2000，an acquirer from 
Hubei (湖北天發集團公司）purchased a block involving 45.43% of Shashi 
Power28，s shares and became the largest shareholder. Each share is priced at RMB 
1.1 at that time. Nearly three years later, an investment company (信達投資有限公 
司）purchased a non-control block shares (2.39% of the total shares) at RMB 1 on 7"� 
June 2003. 
If we tried to compare the two block exchange prices directly, it is observed 
that the control block is priced at a 10% premium. However, such a comparison is 
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not effective as the time difference between the two transactions is so long that the 
fundamental value of the target company may have varied a lot. 
The introduction of market exchange prices in the comparison helps to solve 
the stated problem. The liquidity of the secondary market makes the exchange prices 
change rapidly in response to the fundamental corporate value. In this example, the 
post-announcement market exchange price after the control block transfer is RMB 
11.39 while the post-announcement market exchange price after the non-control 
block transfer is RMB 6.83. As expected, the price difference between liquid and 
illiquid stocks is very large. If we normalize the block transfer prices with the market 
exchange prices, it is found that the normalized control premium is -34%. The result 
is totally different from the ordinary price premium. It is believed that the normalized 
control premium represents the true picture better and is more suitable for the cases 
in China. 
4.3 Testing the determinants of value of corporate control 
As discussed in the previous section, another main part of this thesis is to 
identify the determinants of value of corporate control in China. In order to do so, we 
employ ordinary least square regression estimation to check the effect of twelve 
variables coming from four main categories, namely controlling power, regional 
governance, corporate governance and firm performance. 
4.3.1 Controlling Power 
The shareholding of the largest shareholder is one of the most efficient 
measures about its controlling power in a company. Major corporate decision will be 
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made by shareholder voting, and a larger stake of ownership will essentially turn into 
a higher controlling power. So, we make use of the natural logarithm of the square of 
the largest shareholding after the controlling block share transfer as one of our 
measure of controlling power, and denote it as Absolute_power. 
Absolute— power = In [(largest shareholder shareholding)"�] 
Apart from its own shareholding, the power of other shareholders will also 
affect the controlling power of the largest shareholder. To capture the joint-power 
effect of other shareholders, we make use of the natural logarithm of the sum of 
square of 2"'' to largest shareholding to represent the counter power that the 
largest shareholder faces and denote it as Countenng_power. 
10 
Countering_power = I n ^ ] [(n^* shareholder shareholding)"?] 
,1=2 
To capture both the largest shareholder shareholding effect and the joint-
power shareholding effect from other shareholders in one single variable, we employ 
the use of Herfindahl index to measure the controlling power that the largest 
shareholder enjoyed. Denoted as Relative_power, it is defined as the difference 
between the Herfinaahl index of the largest shareholder's shareholding and the 
Herfindahl index of the 2"^ to lO"' largest shareholders' shareholding after the 
controlling block share transfer. It is clear that a higher Relative_power represents 
that the largest shareholder can exercise a higher degree of control of the corporation 
and face less counter-power from other shareholders. 
Relative_power = (largest shareholder shareholding)"? 
10 
- Y j [(n"' shareholder shareholding”] 
h = 2 
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4.3.2 Regional Governance 
The interaction between regional governance and the value of corporate 
control is one of the main interests of this thesis. As a rapidly growing economy, 
regional disparity within China is severe and various literature use different regional 
development index to study the marketization progress of different provinces and 
cities in China. 
In this thesis, we employ four different measures to capture the regional 
governance disparity in China, namely government intervention, contract 
enforcement, foreign investment and the regional government's effort in decreasing 
non-tax burden of the corporations. All of the variables used are taken during the 
year of the block share transfers which lead to controlling shareholder change. 
Government intervention in business operations is a frequently observed 
phenomenon around the world, especially in developing economies. It may lead to 
rent-seeking and even corruption problem. The independent controlling power of 
business owner is seriously affected if government intervention in business 
operations is severe and collusive agreement between government and corporations 
may exist. Both the daily operation of the corporation as well as the ability for the 
shareholders to extract private benefits will be hammered in the intervening 
environment. Thus, we include the variable Govtjntervention from Du et al. (2007), 
which is constructed based on data from the survey of China's Private Enterprises 
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1995-20044，in our regression analysis to investigate the effect of local government 
intervention on the value of corporate control. The variable Govt_Intervention is 
defined as the proportion of entrepreneurs requesting government help in case of 
business disputes. Government intervention in business operations could be 
indicative of either strong or weak protection of private properties. On the one hand, 
government help may fill the void created by the lack or weakness of the court 
system while on the other hand, government help may lead to rent-seeking and even 
corruption that entrepreneurs lobby or bribe government officials to seek favor in 
resolving business disputes. 
Apart from government intervention, legal institutions and law enforcement 
are also big issue that would exert large influence on corporate operations. Better 
contract enforcement protects transacting parties effectively, and it hinges on 
comprehensive legal institutions and effective law enforcement. Quality of legal 
institutions and degree of law enforcement vary significantly across regions in China 
and we include the variable Contract—Enforcement from Du et al (2007), which is 
again from the survey of China's Private Enterprises, to capture the regional 
institutions and law enforcement information. The variable Contract—Enforcement is 
defined as the proportion of private entrepreneurs answering affirmatively to the 
question: will you use courts to resolve business disputes? 
The amount of foreign investment is a good indicator about the market 
environment. Better regional governance, marketization progress and factor market 
development will attract more foreign investment. We make use of the data from Fan 
4 This survey was conducted by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and Commerce Federation, and the China Society 
of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of ^cial Sciences, in 1995, 1997,2000 and 2002. 
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et al. (2001) about foreign investment and include the variable Foreign—Investment 
in our analysis to see the relationship between regional governance level and value of 
corporate control in China. The variable Foreign—Investment is a score that 
calculated by the proportion of the value of foreign investment (include Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan) to the total GDP of the region. 
Apart from various tax payments, corporations operate in different regions 
will have different non-tax burden. Locations with poor regional governance and 
weak property right protection will have higher non-tax burden which would benefit 
the local government. Corporate owners need to spend more time and money to do 
business in region with high non-tax payments while collusive agreement between 
corporate owners and local government may exist in those regions to extract different 
kinds of benefit through tunneling. We make use of the data from Fan et al (2001) 
about regional government's effort in decreasing non-tax burden in our analysis to 
investigate the effect of regional non-tax burden on value of corporate control in 
China, and denote the variable as DecreasingjionJax. 
4.3.3 Corporate Governance 
Various previous studies discuss the corporate governance issue in China, and 
in this thesis, we would employ three main corporate governance measurements used 
in Bai et al. (2003) to investigate about the determinants of the size of control 
premium in China. All of the variables used for measuring corporate governance are 
taken just before the block share transfers which lead to controlling shareholder 
change. 
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The most common form of tradable shares in China is the A-share which can 
be traded by any mainland Chinese citizen. Some listed companies also issue B-share 
which is open mainly to foreign investors in domestic stock exchanges. A small 
proportion of companies even cross-list their shares in Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
by issuing H-shares. The regulatory and governance requirements are different 
between pure A-share firms and others. Most pure A-share companies are audited by 
local accounting firms where the standard is hardly guaranteed. On the other hand, 
companies with B-share or H-share must comply with the international accounting 
standards and better corporate governance is expected. So, we introduce the 
bjtjshare dummy variable as one of the corporate governance measures. 
b h share = ( " f a company has issued B or H shares 
0 if otherwise 
Apart from the regulations a company faced, the composition of the board of 
directors, which acts as the main decision making and monitoring body, can also 
represent the corporate governance level of the firm. The monitoring role of the 
board of directors is compromised if the chief executive officer of the company is the 
chairman or vice-chairman of the board of directors and has full or partial control of 
the board. Therefore, we introduce the CEO_is_chair dummy variable to proxy the 
corporate governance level of a company, 
1 if CEO is the chairman or a vice 
CEO_is—chair = { chairman of the board of directors 
0 if otherwise 
A higher degree of independence of the board of directors would also 
increase the monitoring power of the board. Independent directors are relatively free 
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from the management's pressure and help to improve the corporate governance level 
of a company. Thus, we introduce the indep_dir_% variable to measure the relative 
power of the independent directors in the board of directors of the target company. 
inde dir % = Number of independent directors in the board of directors 
- ° Total number of people in the board of directors 
4.3.4 Firm Performance 
Previous literature shows that firm performance will also alter the value of 
corporate control. In this thesis, we will use two main firm performance varfiables to 
check their effect on the valuation of control premium in China. 
Profitability is one of the most commonly employed variables when 
analyzing the determinants of the value of corporate control. It is believed that the 
firm performance prior to acquisition will affect the value of corporate control 
premium, and we use the return of equity {ROE) of the target firm as a proxy to its 
profitability. 
Apart from the magnitude of past performance, the stability of corporate 
earnings may also affect the value of corporate control. An investment will be more 
risky if the return is relatively unstable, and we try to capture the level of risk 
associated with the target company by the variable Profit_SD which is measured by 
the standard deviation of the 5-year pre-trade profit and normalized by the firm's 
total asset. 
4.3.5 Control variables 
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In an attempt to control other un-captured effects, we include three specific 
variables in our regression analyses as control variables, namely firm size, leverage 
and acquirer identity. 
Firm size is one of the most widely used control variables in different studies. 
The inclusion of firm size in the regression analysis can help in controlling the 
differences between companies' fundamental value. We use the natural logarithm of 
asset value {In—asset) of the target firm for firm size. 
The degree of leverage is another useful control variable. As a percentage of 
debt over the total equity value, the debt-to-equity ratio measures the debt burden 
and investment risk of the corporation, and we denote this variable as Leverage. 
Block acquirers in China are mainly state-owned companies or privately-
owned corporations. We include the dummy variable Private—acquirer which equal 
to 1 if the block acquirer is privately-owned corporations and 0 otherwise to check if 
there exists any interaction between block acquirer identity and value of corporate 
control. Although acquirer identity itself may not have a clear impact on the 
valuation of control premium, the inclusion of this variable can certainly serve as a 
control variable to minimize other effects in the regression analysis. 
Simple and multivariate regression analyses are employed to investigate the 
effect of different variables on the value of corporate control. In the following 
sections, detail data description and the empirical results of different statistical tests 
will be discussed. 
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5. Data 
5.1 Existence of value of corporate control 
We make use of the China Stock Market & Accounting Research Dataset 
(CSMAR) to identify block transfer transaction in China during 1999 to 2004. We 
supplement and validate the data by obtaining company annual reports through 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
Each block transfer is identified as either involving control transaction or not. 
We then match each control block transfer with a non-control block transfer of the 
same company as discussed in the methodology. 
Throughout the five years time window, 95 block-pairs are identified from 76 
companies. Among the 76 sample companies, 59 (77.6%) have only one block-pair 
observed during the five-year period, 15 (19.7%) have two pairs observed while only 
2 (2.6%) companies have three block-pairs observed. When looking into the stock 
exchange distribution of these companies, 41 (53.9%) come from the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange while the remaining 35 (46.1%) come from the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. Table 2 summarizes the company information presented here. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
China Stock Market & Accounting Research Dataset classifies companies 
into six different industries, namely commerce, conglomerates, finance, industrials, 
properties and utilities. According to the classification, more than half of our sample 
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companies come from the industrial industry, constituting 59.2% of the sample, 
while none of the sample company is a financial institution. The second largest group 
among the sample companies is conglomerate company, making up 19.7% of the 
sample while 13.2% of the sample companies come from the commerce sector. 
Utility companies represent 5.3% of the total sample while property firms constitute 
the remaining 2.6%. Table 3 summarizes the industry distribution of the sample 
companies discussed above. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
The geographical distribution of the 76 sample companies is diverse. 
Shanghai and Sichuan contribute the largest number to the whole sample, each 
having 9 companies (11.8%) involved. The whole sample comes from 23 provinces 
and province-level cities and Table 4 shows a detailed geographical distribution of 
the sample. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Regarding the composition of the 95 block-pairs, we find that the average 
size of the control block transfer involves 24.8% of the target company's shares with 
a median of 26.6%. The control block size ranges from a minimum of 4.3% to a 
maximum of 65.4% throughout the 95 sample companies. The average time 
difference between control block transfer and non-control block transfer is 0.97 years 
while the median is 0.42 years. About 80% of the time differences between 
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transactions are under 2 years while the differences range from 0 to 4.39 years. Table 
5 summarizes the block information presented here. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
5.2 Determinants of value of corporate control 
5.2.1 Controlling Power 
The shareholding of the largest shareholder varies across companies. The 
largest shareholder of one company owns only 8.86% shares, while that of two other 
companies in our sample owns more than half of the total shares. The average 
shareholding of the largest shareholder is 27.14% with a similar median of 27.65%. 
We use the natural logarithm of the square of the largest shareholding proportion as 
one of our measurement about controlling power. 
The counter-power of other big shareholders can also be an effective measure 
of controlling power of the largest shareholder. We use the natural logarithm of the 
sum of square of the to the IQU* largest shareholders' shareholdings to capture this 
counter-power effect. The natural logarithm of the sum of square of the to the 10^� 
largest shareholders' shareholdings has an average value of -3.55 with a range from 
-7.14 to -2.09. 
To better capture the relative controlling power, we make use of the 
Herfindahl index to measure the controlling power that the largest shareholder enjoys. 
We define Relative_power as the difference between the square of the largest 
shareholder's shareholdings and the sum of square of the to the largest 
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shareholders' shareholdings. The average Relativej}ower obtained is 0.049 with a 
median of 0.033. The minimum and maximum Relativejpower observed are -0.059 
and 0.421 respectively. 
Table 6 in the appendix lists out the details of the three controlling power 
variables discussed here. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
5.2.2 Regional Governance 
All the four regional governance variables under consideration vary greatly 
across different regions. For government intervention in business operations, the 
index varies from 0.00 in Qinghai to 0.18 in Guizhou. Economically developed 
regions like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong have the index ranging from 0.05 to 
0.10. 
The contract enforcement index also varies across different regions. The 
index varies from 0.10 in Shanxi and Jilin to 0.41 in Gansu. Economically developed 
regions like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong have the index ranging from 0.22 to 
0.25. 
The foreign investment index varies greatly for different regions as expected. 
The index varies from 0.00 in Qinghai to 10.00 in Guangdong. Economically 
developed regions like Beijing and Shanghai have the index of 6.55 and 5.04 
respectively. 
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Local government's effort in decreasing the non-tax burden for corporations 
varies across different regions. The index range from 0.00 in the Hubei area which 
represent a very high non-tax burden faced by corporations to 10.00 in Gansu area 
which represent minimal non-tax burden exist. Economically developed regions like 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong have the index of 8.14，4.93 and 5.37 respectively. 
The detailed distribution of the three regional governance indices across 
different regions can be found in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
5.2.3 Corporate Governance 
The dummy variable bjijshare has the value of 1 if a company issues B-
shares which are mainly for foreign investors in domestic exchange or H-shares in 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The mean value for this variable is 0.042，which 
represents a very little proportion of the sample companies having issued shares 
other than the traditional A-share. 
Another dummy variable used in the analysis is the CEOJsjchair. This 
dummy variable takes value of 1 if the chief executive officer of a company is also 
the chairman or vice-chairman of the board of directors. The mean value for this 
variable is 0.337，which indicates that around one-third of the sample companies 
have their CEO hold the decisive and controlling position in the board. 
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The final variable we consider in this category is indep_dir_%. This variable 
represents the percentage of independent directors in a company's board of directors. 
It has an average value of 0.092. In our sample, some companies have no 
independent directors in their board while some companies have more than 25% 
independent directors who offer relatively objective opinions and exercise more 
monitoring power. 
The detailed descriptive statistics of the three corporate governance variables 
can be found in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
5.2.4 Firm performance 
We use the return on equity (ROE) to measure the profitability of the target 
firm. The average ROE of the sample companies is 0.934% while the median is 
6.067%. The return on equity of the sample companies is widely dispersed, ranging 
from -397% to 334%. 
The normalized five-year standard deviation of net profit (Prqfit SD) is used 
to proxy the corporate earnings risk of the sample companies. Unstable and fluctuant 
profit represents a relatively riskier operation and buyers may require a higher 
premium to acquire such business. The average 5-year standard deviation of net 
profit is RMB 28.6 million while the median is RMB 9.88 million. The value of the 
5-year standard deviation of net profit is also widely dispersed, ranging from RMB 
0.33 million to RMB 431 million. The normalized five-year standard deviation of net 
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profit ranges from nearly zero to 1.16，with the mean and median of 0.057 and 0.018 
respectively. 
The detailed descriptive statistics of the firm performance variables can be 
found in Table 9 of the appendix, 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5.2.5 Control variable 
In this thesis, we include three commonly cited control variables for the 
regression analysis, namely, firm size, leverage and acquirer identity. 
Total asset value is the most common proxy for firm size. Our sample 
companies have a wide range of total assets ranging from RMB 161 million to RMB 
2710 million. The average and the median asset value are RMB 867 million and 
RMB 637 million respectively. To align with previous literature, we take the natural 
logarithm of asset value {ln_asset) to proxy firm size in our regression analysis. 
The degree of leverage is our second control variables. We make use of the 
debt-to-equity ratio in our analysis and found that the average debt-to-equity ratio is 
1.903 with a median of 1.034. Our sample companies have a wide range of debt-to-
equity ratio rangeing from 0.091 to 45.95. 
The final control variable we include in our regression analysis is the identity 
of the acquirer. The dummy variable, Private—acquirer, take value of 1 if the block 
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acquirer is a privately-owned company and take value of 0 otherwise. The average 
value of the dummy variable is 0.337，which indicates that around one-third of all the 
control block transfers are acquired by privately-owned company while others are 
bought by state-owned company. 
The detailed descriptive statistics of the control variables can be found in 
Table 10 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
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6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Existence of value of corporate control 
Based on the selected sample, we run a two-tailed t-test to test the normalized 
control premium with a hypothesized mean of zero. It is found that the normalized 
control premium is statistically different from zero and indicates that the control 
block transfers are typically traded at a premium over non-control block. This finding 
suggests that there exists a positive value premium of corporate control in Chinese 
companies. 
The average value of corporate control observed is 14.0% among the 95 
sample transfer-pairs. The detailed result of the t-test is listed in Table 11. 
[Insert Table 11 Herel 
6.2 Robustness tests 
Post-announcement day market exchange price is used to normalize the block 
prices to obtain control premium in the previous test. Although it aligns with the 
majority of previous literature, some studies also employ different measures to do the 
comparison. In this section, we will check the robustness of the existence of control 
premium by using different market exchange prices to normalize the control 
premium. 
Apart from the post-announcement day market exchange price, we also use 
the 5-day average and monthly average post-announcement market exchange prices 
36 
to do the robustness test. Moreover, we also employ the pre-announcement day 
market exchange price, 5-day average and monthly average pre-announcement 
market exchange prices to do the normalization and check the statistical significance 
of the value of corporate control. 
All the robustness tests support our hypothesis about the existence of positive 
value of corporate control in China. No matter we employ post-announcement or pre-
announcement exchange prices to do our analysis, the result is robust. The details of 
the tests can be found in Table 12. 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
Apart from using different market trading prices to do the normalization, we 
also want to check the robustness about the sample selection. As discussed in section 
5，more than 20% of our sample companies have more than one transfer-pair during 
our sampling period. We apply another robustness test by limiting one block transfer 
for each company and check if the positive significant value of corporate control still 
exists or not. In case for companies with more than one transfer-pair during our 
sampling period, we will use the most recent one for the analysis. 
We thus derive a sub-sample consisting of 76 companies. However, it has no 
influence about our main hypothesis and significant positive value of corporate 
control is still observed. The magnitude of the control premium for the decreased 
sub-sample is 14.14% which does not differ much from our original setting. Details 
of this robustness check can be found in Table 13. 
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[Insert Table 13 Here] 
As discussed in previous section, transaction of illiquid shares in China take 
place in either private placement or auction. Majority of transactions in our sample 
are carried out by private placement, while only 3 cases are through auction. We try 
to test the existence of value of corporate control by excluding the auction cases but 
no influence about our main result observed. Significant positive value of corporate 
control is still observed, with an average of 13.41%, which does not differ much 
from our original setting. Details of this robustness check can be found in Table 14. 
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
6.3 Determinants of value of corporate control 
In this section, we will discuss the empirical results obtained from the 
ordinary least square regression analysis. It aims at finding out the key determinants 
of value of corporate control in China. Empirical results for individual category will 
be firstly discussed while multivariate regression analysis with different categories' 
variables will be presented at the end. 
6.3.1 Controlling Power 
By using the three variables in the controlling power category separately as 
the independent variable, we run simple regressions to check the relationship 
between the value of corporate control and controlling power. It is found that the 
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results support our hypothesis that the value of corporate control varies positively 
with acquirers' controlling power on the target company. 
Simple regression analysis shows that the value of corporate control varies 
positively with the largest shareholder's shareholding while varies negatively with 
the counter power from other big shareholders (measured by the natural logarithm of 
the sum of square of to lO"' largest shareholders' shareholding). Although both 
variables are not statistically significant at any traditional level, simple regression on 
10 
Relative_power {(largest shareholder shareholding)八2 - [(n山 shareholder 
h = 2 
shareholding)A2]}, which capture both the largest shareholder's shareholdings and 
the counter power effect in one single variable is highly significant. It is found that 
the value of corporate control varies positively with Relative_power with a p-value 
0.018. These results conclude that the more controlling power an acquirer is expected 
to enjoy, the higher price it will pay for the controlling block transfer. 
6.3.2 Regional Governance 
Although better regional governance provides better support and protection to 
corporations, the possibilities for the largest shareholder to extract private benefits 
decrease. If we link the control premium with private benefits of control, better 
regional governance will effectively decrease the value of corporate control that the 
acquirer paid during control block transfers. 
Simple regression analysis shows that the value of corporate control increases 
in regions with more severe government intervention in business operations and 
decreases in regions with a higher level of contract enforcement. Although both 
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variables are not statistically significant at any traditional level, the other two 
variables under consideration, Foreign—Investment and DecreasingjionJax, shows 
statistically significant result. Foreign investment increases in regions with 
comprehensive legal institution, efficient and effective legal system, better regional 
governance and stronger protection of corporations. It is found that the value of 
corporate control varies negatively with foreign investment and has a p-value 0.038. 
It is also found that the value of corporate control decreases in regions where the 
local government put more effort in minimizing non-tax burden. These results show 
that the value of corporate control in China is higher in regions with poor regional 
governance which provide business owners more chances to extract private benefits 
of control. 
6.3.3 Corporate Governance 
Various studies show that shareholders are willing to pay a premium for a 
better-managed company. Better corporate governance can reduce the tunneling 
problem and better protect the minority shareholders. However, when we consider 
the value of corporate control, better corporate governance means that the largest 
shareholder has fewer chances to extract private benefits of control. So, it is 
hypothesized that the value of corporate control in China varies negatively with the 
target company's corporate governance level. 
As discussed in the previous section, regulations and accounting standards 
differ between companies with pure A-shares and companies with B- or H-share. 
Simple regression analysis finds that the block transfer prices are higher for pure A-
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share companies which are generally treated as having a lower level of corporate 
governance. 
It is believed that independent directors can exercise more monitoring power 
in the board of directors. Simple regression analysis found that the value of corporate 
control in China varies negatively with the percentage of independent directors in the 
board. This shows that unlike general investors, better governed corporations are not 
favored by block acquirers. 
Apart from the percentage of independent directors, the concurrent position 
of chief executive officer and chairman or vice-chairman of the board will also 
decrease the monitoring ability of the board of directors. Statistically significant 
result is found when we regress the value of corporate control against the dummy 
variable indicating the concurrent position situation. It is found that block acquirers 
are paying a higher price for buying companies with the concurrent position problem 
and all these results indicate that the value of corporate control in China varies 
negatively with the level of corporate governance. 
6.3.4 Firm Performance 
Return on equity {ROE) is one of the key measures about profitability of a 
company. Effect between profitability and value of corporate control varies in 
previous literature. Dyck and Zingales (2002) find a positive relationship between 
profitability and control premium in their international analysis while Trojanowski 
(2003) find that block acquirers are paying a higher premium for less profitable firms 
in Poland. In our sample of Chinese companies, the result aligns with Trojanowski's 
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finding and it may be due to the existence of higher possibilities to extract private 
benefits of control in poorly performing firms in developing countries like Poland 
and China. 
Risk level of the target company is another concern for the block acquirer. 
We make use of the normalized five-year standard deviation of net profit {Profit_SD) 
to proxy the risk level of the target company and found that it varies negatively with 
the value of corporate control as expected. It indicates that the block acquirers prefer 
relatively stable investment return on their block purchases. 
Table 15 summarizes the results of simple regression analysis. It is found that 
the value of corporate control in China varies positively with controlling power and 
negatively with regional and corporate governance levels. The control premium also 
increases with less profitable and more risky companies. 
[Insert Table 15 Here] 
Univariate analysis is also conducted and the results can be found in Table 16. 
For each continuous explanatory variable, we partition the whole sample into two 
sub-samples by the median value of the explanatory variables; while for the dummy 
explanatory variables, the two sub-samples are constructed by the data with the 
explanatory variable equal to zero and one respectively. As a supplement to the 
simple regression analysis, although the result is weaker, it is basically consistent 
with those from the simple regression. It suggests that the control premium in China 
is positively related to the controlling power of the largest shareholder, and the value 
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of control is higher for poorly-governed corporations as well as companies located in 
regions with poor regional governance. 
[Insert Table 16 Here] 
6.3.5 Multivariate regression analysis 
In this section, we will employ the multivariate regression analysis to 
investigate the key determinants of value of corporate control in China. Multivariate 
regression analysis helps in identifying the pool of explanatory variables that better 
contribute to the explanation of the control premium observed and check their effects 
on the value of corporate control. 
Table 16 reports the ordinary least square estimation results where the 
dependent variable is the normalized control premium. We make use of the stepwise 
inclusion strategy to select the best-fitting regressors and the selected model (Model 
23) yield the following explanatory equation with four regressors: 




F = 5.342, p-value = 0.001, adj. R^ = 15.6% 
All regressors are statistically significant at the 5% level 
Relative_power capture the shareholding effect from both the largest 
shareholder and other big shareholders to provide an effective measure of controlling 
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power. The coefficient of the first regressor shows a positive relation between the 
magnitude of value of corporate control and the controlling power that the block 
buyers acquired. 
Foreign—Investment is one of our proxies about regional governance. It is 
trivial that foreign investment will increase in regions with comprehensive legal 
institution, effective legal system, strong corporate protection and better regional 
governance. It is found that the block buyers are paying a premium when buying 
companies in regions with relatively poor regional governance. This result shows 
that it may be relatively easier for corporate owners to extract private benefits of 
control in poorly-governed regions that have more tunneling opportunities. 
The effects of corporate governance on the value of corporate control are 
similar to those of regional governance. Private benefits of control can be extracted 
relatively more easily in poorly-govemed corporations. When the chief executive 
officer holds a concurrent position as the chairman or vice-chairman of the board of 
directors, the monitoring function of the board is weakened, which represent a 
weaker corporate governance practice. The positive relation found between the value 
of corporate control and the variable CEOJs_chair indicates the negative 
relationship between control premium and corporate governance level. 
The effect of profitability of the target company on the control premium 
varies across different studies. With our sample companies in China, our result aligns 
with Trojanowski (2003) and found that the value of corporate control varies 
negatively with profitability. Unlike western developed counties, there may be higher 
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possibilities to extract private benefits of control in poorly performing firms in 
developing countries like Poland and China, and thus, the block acquirers are paying 
a higher price for having the controlling power of poorly performing firms. 
In summary, the multivariate regression result is consistent with the simple 
regression analysis as well as our expectation. It shows that the value of corporate 
control in China varies positively with the controlling power and negatively with the 
regional and corporate governance level. Similar to the case in Poland, control 
premium in China is higher in companies with relatively poor prior trade 
performance. Table 17 in the appendix reports the details of the multivariate 
regression analysis. 
[Insert Table 17 Here] 
Regional governance may work together with corporate governance to affect 
the value of corporate control. For instance, there may be complementarity between 
the two levels of governance: they may reinforce each other. To see the interplay of 
regional and corporate governance, we add into regressions the interaction terms of 
regional and corporate governance variables. However, no significant results are 
observed. The result can be found in Table 18. 
[Insert Table 18 Here] 
We are also interested if private acquirers have different attitudes towards the 
explanatory variables when compared to other block buyers. We add into regressions 
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the interaction terms between the dummy control variable, Private—acquirer, and the 
explanatory variables. However, no significant results are observed and the result can 
be found in Table 19. 
[Insert Table 19 Here] 
The overall results are not qualitatively affected when we make the correction 
for heteroskedasticity. Different independent variables are used in different models to 
check the effect and no abnormality found. We allow only one variable from the 
regional governance category in each model because of the high correlation between 
the variables from the regional governance category. Table 20 in the appendix 
reports the correlation matrix. 
[Insert Table 20 Here] 
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7. Summary and Conclusion 
The dichotomy of tradable and non-tradable shares in China's stock market 
provides a unique setting to study the value of corporate control with the liquidity 
effect minimized. In this thesis, we analyze block transfer cases of Chinese 
companies between 1999 and 2004. During the five years time-span, 95 block 
transfer pairs from 76 companies are identified. 
This thesis follows the rationale pioneered by Barclay and Holdemess (1989) 
which compare block trade prices with post-announcement exchange prices. 
However, direct application is not possible because almost all block trades that 
happened in China involve illiquid shares that have a large discount when compared 
to the tradable common shares. We calculate a normalized control premium by 
comparing two separate block transactions of the same company, in which one of 
them involved control transfers while the other did not, and normalize the block 
transfer prices with the market exchange prices. 
Based on the selected sample, it is found that controlling block shares are 
priced 14% higher than non-controlling block on average. The result is significantly 
different from zero and demonstrates that a positive value premium of corporate 
control exists in China with the liquidity effect minimized. 
Apart from the existence of control premium, this thesis also analyzes the 
determinants of the value of corporate control through multivariate regression 
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analysis. Four variables were identified to have better explanatory power for the 
value of corporate control observed in China: 
(1) Controlling Power - it is found that the value of corporate control is higher if the 
block acquirer has a stronger controlling power over the corporation, 
(2) Foreign Investment - as a proxy for regional governance, it is found that block 
buyers are paying a premium when buying companies in regions with less 
foreign investment. As foreign investment increased in regions with 
comprehensive legal institution, effective legal system, stronger protection for 
corporations and better regional governance, it is believed that extracting private 
benefits of control in poorly-govemed regions is relatively easier. 
(3) Concurrent position of CEO and chairman of board of directors - as a proxy of 
corporate governance, it is found that the effect of corporate governance on the 
value of corporate control is similar to those of regional governance. Concurrent 
position of chief executive officer and the chairman or vice-chairman of the 
board of directors represents a weaker corporate governance practice as it 
weakens the monitoring power of the board. Empirical results show that the value 
of corporate control increases when block buyers acquire companies with the 
concurrent position practice. 
(4) Profitability - it is found that the effect between profitability of the target 
company and the value of corporate control is negatively related. Unlike Western 
developed countries, there may be higher possibilities to extract private benefits 
of control in poorly performing firms in China, and the block acquirers are 
paying a higher price for having the controlling power of poorly performing 
firms. 
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In summary, both simple and multivariate regression analysis show that the 
value of corporate control in China varies positively with the largest shareholder's 
controlling power. The block acquirers are paying a higher price for companies 
located in poorly-govemed regions or having poor corporate governance practice. 
Similar to the case in Poland, control premium in China is higher in companies with 
relatively poor performance prior to block transfers. 
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Table 2 Composition of the sample - company information 
Table 2.1 Block pairs identified per company 
number percentage 
One Pair of block-transfer / Company 59 77.6% 
Two Pairs of block-transfer / Company 15 19.7% 
Three Pairs of block-transfer / Company 2 2.6% 
Total 76 100% 
Table 2.2 Stock Exchange distribution of the companies 
number percentage 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 41 53.9% 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 35 46.1 % 
Total 76 100% 
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Table 3 Composition of the sample - Company Industry distribution 
CAMAR Industry Classification number percentage 
Commerce 10 13.2% 
Conglomerates 15 19.7% 
Finance 0 0% 
Industrials 45 59.2% 
Properties 2 2.6% 
Utilities 4 5.3% 
Total 76 100% 
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Table 4 Composition of the sample - Company Location Distribution 
Registered Office Location number percentage 
Beijing 1 1.3% 
Chongqing 1 1.3% 
Fujian 6 7.9% 
Gansu 2 2.6% 
Guangdong 7 9.2% 
Guangxi 3 3.9% 
Guizhou 1 1.3% 
Hainan 1 1.3% 
Hebei 4 5.3% 
Heilongjiang 1 1.3% 
Henan 2 2.6% 
Hubei 5 6.6% 
Hunan 1 1.3% 
Jilin 6 7.9% 
Liaoning 4 5.3% 
Ningxia 1 1.3% 
Shaanxi 1 1.3% 
Shandong 4 5.3% 
Shanghai 9 11.8% 
Sichuan 9 11.8% 
Xinjiang 1 1-3% 
Yunnan 3 3.9% 
Zhejiang 3 3.9% 
Total 76 100% 
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Table 5 Composition of the sample - block information 
5.1 Controlling Block Size 
Average Block Size 24.78% 
Median Block Size 26.62% 
Minimum Block Size 4.31 % 
Maximum Block Size 65.38% 
5.2 Time difference between control and non-control block transaction 
Average Time Difference 0.97 years 
Median Time Difference 0.42 years 
Minimum Time Difference 0.00 years 
Maximum Time Difference 4.39 years 
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Table 6 Data description on controlling power variables 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Largest shareholder 27.14% 27.65% 8.86% 65.38o/o shareholding 
Absolute jpower -2.712 -2.571 -4.847 -0.850 
Countering_power -3.550 -3.540 -7.138 -2.088 
Relative_power 0.049 0.033 -0.059 0.421 
Note: 
Absolute一 power = ln[(largest shareholder shareholding)八2] 
10 
CounteringjDower = I n ^ [(n"' shareholder shareholding)"?] 
11=2 
Relative_power = (largest shareholder shareholding)^? 
- X [(n"' shareholder shareholding)^2] 
«=2 
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Table 7 Regional Governance Indices 
, Government Contract Foreign , Effort in Location . ^ „ „ ^ . ^ ^ decreasing non-intervention Enforcement Investment ^ , , 
tax burden 
Beijing 0.10 0.24 6.55 8.14 
Chongqing 0.13 0.27 1.05 7.56 
Fujian 0.10 0.33 8.20 5.96 
Gansu 0.10 0.41 0.18 10.0 
Guangdong 0.05 0.22 10.0 5.37 
Guangxi 0.14 0.23 2.25 9.53 
Guizhou 0.18 0.27 0.19 8.06 
Hainan 0.14 0.26 7.43 8.19 
Hebei 0.06 0.22 1.54 4.09 
Heilongjiang 0.08 0.20 0.67 4.05 
Henan 0.04 0.15 0.70 1.61 
Hubei 0.17 0.16 1.60 0.00 
Hunan 0.08 0.30 1.31 3.03 
Jilin 0.10 0.10 1.19 6.22 
Liaoning 0.09 0.18 1.73 6.84 
Ningxia 0.08 0.17 1.42 4.88 
Shaanxi 0.09 0.23 1.06 6.42 
Shandong 0.05 0.32 2.03 6.52 
Shanghai 0.07 0.25 5.04 4.93 
Sichuan 0.13 0.27 0.53 6.36 
Xinjiang 0.14 0.35 0.01 8.23 
Yunnan 0.10 0.31 0.47 8.51 
Zhejiang 0.10 0.22 1.55 6.05 
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Table 8 Data description on corporate governance variables 
Table 8.1 b_h一share 
b h share = | " f a company has issue B or H shares 
0 if otherwise 
b_h_share = 1 4 4.21% 
b_h—share = 0 91 95.79% 
Table 8.2 CEO_is一chair 
1 if CEO is the chairman or a vice 
CEO一is_chair = { chairman of the board of directors 
0 if otherwise 
CEO_is_chair = 1 32 33.68% 
CEO—is—chair = 0 63 66.32% 
Table 8.3 indep_dir_% 






Table 9 Data description on firm performance data 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
ROE 0.934% 6.067% -397.1% 333.8% 
5-year standard RMB 28.6 RMB 9.88 RMB 0.33 RMB 431 
deviation of profit million million million million 
Profit_SD 0.0568 0.0176 0.0003 1.1571 
Note: 
1) ROE is the return of equity, which proxy the profitability of the target company. 
2) Profit一SD is the five-year standard deviation of net profit normalized by the total 
value of the firm. It proxy the earning risk of the sample company. 
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Table 10 Data description on control variables 
Table 10.1 Descriptive statistics on asset value and debt-to-equity ratio 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
. , 1 RMB 867 RMB 637 RMB 161 RMB 2710 Asset value .„. .„. million million million million 
In (Asset value) 20.369 20.273 18.895 21.719 
Debt-to-Equity ratio 1.903 1.034 0.0912 45.95 
Table 10.2 Acquirer Identity 
Private acquirer = ( H f 出e block acquirer is privately-owned company 
- 0 if otherwise 
Private—acquirer = 1 32 33.7% 
Private_acquirer = 0 63 66.3% 
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Table 11 Existence of value of corporate control — t-test 
The null hypothesis is that the normalized control premium equal to zero, while the 
control premium is normalized by the post-announcement day market exchange price 
pC pNC pNC 
(Normalized control premium = (—^ - ， 
Ph P'l 
No. of observation 95 
Mean 14.00% 
t-value 2.250 
Significant Level (2-tailed) 0.027 
5 pC is the control-block exchange price, pNC is the non-control block exchange price, P" is the post-
announcement market exchange price while the underscripts represent the time. 
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Table 12 Robustness test - normalization by different market exchange prices 
Apart from the post-announcement day market exchange price, we also use the post-
announcement 5-day average market exchange price, post-announcement monthly 
average market exchange price, pre-announcement day market exchange price, pre-
announcement 5-day average market exchange price and pre-announcement monthly 
average market exchange price to do the robustness checking. 
Mean t-value Sig. Level (2-tailed) 
post-announcement day 14.00% 2.250 0.027 




pre-announcement day 14.20% 2.152 0.034 





Table 13 Robustness test - limitation on allowing only one transfer-pair for each 
company 
This robustness test focuses on sample selection. By limiting only one transfer-pair 
(in case of more than one transfer-pair exist, we choose the most recent one to do the 
analysis) for each company, we check if the result obtained before will be affected or 
not. 
No. of observation 76 
Mean 14.14% 
t-value 2.267 
Significant Level (2-tailed) 0.026 
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Table 14 Robustness test - excluding auction transactions 
This robustness test focuses on sample selection, and exclude block transactions 
through auction instead of private placement. 
No. of observation 92 
Mean 13.41% 
t-value 2.120 
Significant Level (2-tailed) 0.0367 
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Table 15 Simple Regression Analysis 
This table presents the simple regression analysis result when different interested 
variables serve as the independent variable separately. Ordinary least square 
regression is applied to regress these variables separately against the normalized 
control premium.""'® 
Coefficient t-value p-value 
A) Controlling Power 
1) Absolutejpower 0.00767 0.42 0.675 
2) Countering_power -0.00301 -0.23 0.822 
3) Relative_power ** 0.373 2.41 0.018 
B) Regional Governance 
4) Govtjntervention 0.417 1.27 0.206 
5) Contract-Enforcement -0.193 -1.09 0.277 
6) Foreign一Investment ** -0.00823 -2.11 0.038 
7) Decreasing_non一tax ** -0.0109 -2.10 0.038 
C) Corporate Governance 
8) b_h_share -0.0631 -1.05 0.295 
9) CEO_is_chair ** 0.0754 2.58 0.011 
10) indep_dir_% -0.167 -1.24 0.218 
D) Firm Performance 
11) ROE -0.0261 -1.21 0.230 
12) Profit_SD ** -0.205 -2.46 0.016 
* Significantly different from 0 with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from 0 with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
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Table 16 Univariate Analysis 
This table presents the univariate analysis result. For each continuous explanatory 
variable, we partition the whole sample into two sub-samples by the median value of 
the explanatory variables; while for the dummy explanatory variables, the two sub-




sub- sub- difference t-value p-value 
sample sample 
mean' mean" 
A) Controlling Power 
1) Absolute_power 0.0370 0.0228 0.0143 0.55 0.582 
2) Countering_power 0.0086 0.0475 -0.0389 -1.63 0.107 
3) Relative_power 0.0541 0.0132 0.0409 1.63 0.106 
B) Regional Governance 
4) Govtjntervention 0.0368 0.0157 0.0211 0.87 0.387 
5) Contract—Enforcement 0.0181 0.0374 -0.0192 -0.80 0.428 
6) Foreign—Investment * -0.0077 0.0421 -0.0498 -1.91 0.059 
7) Decreasing_non_tax 0.0172 0.0429 -0.0257 -1.045 0.298 
C) Corporate Governance 
8) b_h_share -0.0330 0.0301 -0.0631 -1.05 0.295 
9) CEO_is_chair ** 0.0425 -0.0329 0.0754 2.58 0.011 
10) indep_dir_% 0.0136 0.0428 -0.0292 -1.21 0.229 
D) Firm Performance 
11) ROE 0.0201 0.0450 -0.0249 -0.94 0.348 
12) Profit_SD -0.0107 0.0376 -0.0483 -1.65 0.102 
* Significantly different from 0 with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from 0 with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
I For dummy variables, this represent the sub-sample with the explanatory variable equal to zero 
“For dummy variables, this represent the sub-sample with the explanatory variable equal to one 
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Table 17 Multivariate Regression Analysis""'® - continued 
This table presents the results of the multivariate regression analysis. Stepwise 
regression is applied in Model 19 to identify variables with better explanatory power 
on the value of corporate control. The dependent variable used is the normalized 
control premium 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
“ 0.0943 0.305 0.427 0.295 0 . 4 9 5 ~ 
Constant (0.24) (0.81) (1.15) (0.79) (1.35) 




3) Relative_power “ 卯） 
B) Regional Governance 
,、广 , 0.437 4) Govt_Intervention (1 31) 
-0 208 
5) Contract-Enforcement ( j ！乃 D . 1 -0.00699* 6) Foreign—Investment (_ j gg) 
，、n , -0.0109** 
7) Decreasing_non_tax (-2。今） 




D) Firm Performance 
11) ROE 
12) Profit一SD 
E) Control Variable 
-0.00353 -0.0156 -0.0170 -0.0122 -0.0199 
In-Asset (-0.18) (-0.85) (-0.93) (-0.66) (-1.11) -0.00981 0.0210 0.0170 0.0165 0.0213 Leverage (-0.14) (0.30) (0.24) (0.24) (0.31) „ . , -0.0211 -0.0355 -0.0349 -0.0188 -0.0298 Pr,vate_acqu.rer (.Q.gi) (-1.37) (-1.35) (-0.70) (-1.17) 
Adjusted R-square 2.49% 0.11% -0.29% 1-23% 2.93% 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 17 Multivariate Regression Analysis""'® - continued 
一 Model 6 7 8 9 10 
“ 0 3 3 0 -0.458 0398 o T s i ~ Constant (0.86) (1.27) (1.07) (1.05) (0.38) 
A) Constrolling Pbwer 
1) Absolute_power 
2) Countering_power 
, � n , 0.284 
3) Relative_power (1 





C) Corporate Governance 
� � ^ ^ k . -0.0464 -0.0404 -0.0334 
8)b_h_share (.0.74) (-0.66) (-0.55) 
A、cpc . L • 0.0827** 0.0778** 0.0715** 9)CE0_.s_cha.r (2.54) (2.33) (2.15) . . - 0 . 1 4 4 -0.0853 -0.0776 10)mdep_d.r_% (.i .05) (-0.62) (-0.57) 
D) Firm Performance 
11) ROE 
12) Profit_SD 
E) Control Variable 
-0.0146 -0.0255 -0.0172 -0.0216 -0.00958 
In—Asset (-0.77) (-1.41) (-0.94) (-1.15) (-0.48) 
0.0132 0.0515 0.00539 0.0410 0.0181 
Leverage (0.19) (0.73) (0.08) (0.57) (0.25) 
. -0.0303 -0.00849 -0.0282 -0.00602 0.000724 Private一 acquirer ( . 1 . 1 7 ) (-0.32) (-1.08) (-0.22) (0.03) 
Adjusted R-square -1.18% 5.03% -0.57% 3.75% 5.60% 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 17 Multivariate Regression Analys is""'® - continued 
— Model 11 12 13 14 15 
- 0.307 0.446 0.115 0.254 
Constant (-1.43) (0.84) (1.20) (0.29) (0.64) 
A) Constrolling Power 
1) Absolutejjower 
2) Countering—power 
… ， . 0.375** 0.293* 3)Relative_power (2.25) (1.76) 
B) Regional Governance 
0.272 




C) Corporate Governance 
. , 0.00280 8) b_h_share (q.qs) 0.0831** 9) CEO_is_chair (2.56) 
-0.0395 10) indep_dir_% ( . q j o ) 
D) Firm Performance 
-0.0370 -0.0355 -0.0365* -0.495** 
(-1.66) (-1.63) (-1.71) (-2.29) 
-0.201** -0.197** -0.208** -0.186** 
12) Protit_bU ( 2 37) (.2.34) (-2.52) (2.27) 
E) Control Variable 
-0.249 -0.0126 -0.0193 -0.00338 -0.0158 
In—Asset (-1.34) (-0.70) (-1.05) (-0.18) (-0.80) 
0.0148 0.00255 -0.00311 -0.0320 0.0121 
Leverage (0.21) (-0.04) (0.964) (-0.47) (0.17) 
„ . -0.0389 -0.0325 -0.0390 -0.0273 -0.00964 Pnvate_acqu.rer (.1.50) (-1.29) (-1.54) (-1.08) (-0.37) 
Adjusted R-square 1.21% 4.18% 5.91% 10.03% 14.07% 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 17 Multivariate Regression Analys is""'® - continued 
一 Model 16 17 18 19 20 — 
一 " " ‘ 0 3 7 0 0 3 ^ ~ 
constant (0.81) (0.60) (0.93) (0.66) (0.85) 
A) Constrolling Power 
1) Absolute—power 
2) Countering_power 
, � „ , ‘ . 0.282* 0.316* 0.254 0.295* 0.291* 
3) Relative—power (i.69) (1.93) (1.51) (1.79) (1.77) 
B) Regional Governance 
M r … 0.272 4) Govt_Intervention � 86) 
r … ‘ n r , -0.198 -0.172 5) Contract-Enforcement ( “ � （ j 
, � r > • I _ , -0.00506 
6) Foreign_Investment (-121) 
，、n ‘ -0.00772 
7) Decreasing_non_tax ( 1 
C) Corporate Governance 
. . -0.00622 0.00650 -0.0138 «) b_h_sliare (-0.11) (0.11) (-0.24) 
. . 0.0799** 0.0815** 0.0841** 0.0850*** 0.0842*** 9) CbU_is_chair (2.46) (2.52) (2.62) (2.70) (2.68) 
, � � . � - 0 . 0 8 0 5 -0.0379 -0.0439 10).ndep_d.r_% (.0.60) (-0.29) (-0.34) 
D) Firm Performance 
-0.0479** -0.0511** -0.0438** -0.0499** -0.0489** 
(-2.25) (-2.37) (-2.06) (-2.36) (-2.33) 
-0.199** -0.170** -0.186** -0.187** -0.201** 
12) Protit_bU (-2 46) (-2.03) (-2.31) (-2.31) (-2.53) 
E) Control Variable 
-0.0150 -0.0130 -0.0181 -0.0162 -0.0162 
In-Asset (-0.76) (-0.66) (-0.92) (-0.84) (-0.84) 
0.00485 0.00880 0.0151 0.0154 0.0118 
Leverage (0.07) (0.13) (0.22) (0.23) (0.17) 
. -0.00978 0.00193 -0.00504 -0.0101 -0.0105 Pnvate_acquirer (-0.37) (0.07) (-0.20) (-0.39) (-0.41) 
Adjusted R-square 14.67% 14.83% 15.71% 15.97% 16.29% 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 17 Multivariate Regression Analysis""'® - continued 
— Model 21 22 23 24 
“ 0.229 0.388 0.0254 0.304 Constant (0.60) (1.00) (0.397) (0.78) 
A) Constrolling Power 
1) Absolute_power 
2) CounteringjDOwer 
, � „ , . 0.316* 0.259 0.350** 0.296* 
3)Relat,ve_power 0 .96) (1.57) (2.37) (1.80) 
B) Regional Governance 
4) Govt_Intervention 
5) Contract一Enforcement 
,�D . , ,备 -0.00502 -0.00758** -0.00733* 
6) Foreign一Investment ( .123) (-2.00) (-1.84) ‘ -0.00761 
7) Decreasing_non_tax (-153) 
C) Corporate Governance 
8) b_h_share 
• L • 0.0832*** 0.0866*** 0.0731** 0.0847*** 9)CE0_.s_cha.r (2.65) (2.78) (2.57) (2.65) 10) indep_dir_% 
D) Firm Performance 
-0.0513** -0.0448** -0.0509** -0.0546** 
(-2.43) (-2.15) (-2.46) (-2.55) 
, … ^ -0.169** -0.190** 
12)Pr�fit_SD (.2.05) (-2.40) 
E) Control Variable 
-0.0130 -0.0194 -0.0173 In-Asset (-0.68) (-1.02) (-0.89) 
0.0119 0.0193 0.0297 Leverage (0.18) (0.28) (0.43) 
„ . 0.00151 -0.00609 0.00541 Pnvate_acquirer (0.O6) (-0.24) (0.20) 
Adjusted R-square 16.71% 17.51% 15.59% 13.64% 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 18 Interplay between regional and corporate governance""'® - continued 
To see the interplay of regional and corporate governance, we add into regressions 
the interaction terms of regional and corporate governance variables. However, no 
significant results are observed. 
Model i ii iii iv 
“ -0.0250 -0.0252 -0.0253 -0.0253 L�nstant (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.85) (-0.84) 
A) Constrolling Pbwer 
„ , � „ , . 0.344** 0.345** 0.350** 0.346** Var 3) Relative一power (2.28) (2.29) (2.33) (2.30) 
B) Regional Governance 
Var 4) Govt_Intervention 
Var 5) Contract一Enforcement 
、 ， ， 、 D . , . , -0.00737* -0.00739* -0.00760* -0.00743* Var 6) Foreign—Investment ( ！ 39) (.1.89) (-1.92) (-1.89) 
Var 7) Decreasing_non_tax 
C) Corporate Governance 
Var 8) b_h_share 
、，mrnrr^  • u • 0.0732** 0.0732** 0.0731** 0.0732** Var9)CE0_.s_cha,r ( 2 . 5 5 ) (2.55) (2.55) (2.55) 
Var 10) indep_dir_% 
D) Firm Performance 
-0.0506** -0.0506** -0.0510** -0.0507** 
Var l l ) K U b (-2.42) (-2.43) (-2.44) (-2.43) 
E) Interaction Terms 
. , , 0 � -0.242 (var 4 )* (var 8) (.0.28) 
. . / c � * / 0 � -0.0544 
II. (var5)*(var8) ( 0 23) 
. . . / , � * / ox 0.000144 
III. (var 6) * (var 8) (0 02) 
. / ， … 0 、 -0.00199 
IV. (var 7) * (var 8) ( 0 17) 
Adjusted R-square 14.72% 14.70% 14.65% 14.67% 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 18 Interplay between regional and corporate governance""'® - continued 
Model V ^ vii vm 
“ - 0 . 0 2 9 9 -0.0245 -0.0296 -0.0208 *^onstant (-0.98) (-0.82) (-0.79) (-0.70) 
A) Constrolling Power 
, , 0 . 3 3 2 * * 0.333** 0.346** 0.301** Var3)Relat.ve_power (2.22) (2.23) (2.31) (2.00) 
B) Regional Governance 
Var 4) Govt一Intervention 
Var 5) Contract-Enforcement 
、 ， ， 、 D . , _ , -0.00626 -0.00776** -0.00647 -0.00816** Var 6) Foreign一Investment (丄 5 ! ) (.2.04) (-0.92) (-2.15) 
Var 7) Decreasing_non_tax 
C) Corporate Governance 
Var 8) b_h_share 
, , _ . . . 0.0468 0.113** 0.0787* 0.117*** Var9)CE0_.s_cha.r (i .09) (2.11) (1.91) (2.88) 
Var 10) indep_dir_% 
D) Firm Performance 
-0.0501** -0.0533** -0.0502** -0.0488** 
var l l j K U b (-2.41) (-2.55) (-2.36) (-2.36) 
E) Interaction Terms 
, h “ n� 0.286 
V. (var4)* (var9) ( 0 . 8 I ) 
vi. (var 5 ) * (var 9) 
. . / …， r n -0.00157 vii. (var 6 ) * (var 9) (_0 
. . . , ， … o � -0.00770 viu. (var 7) * (var 9) ( -151) 
Adjusted R-square 15.28% 15.38% 14.68% 16.77% 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 18 Interplay between regional and corporate governance""'® - continued 
Model ix x ^ ^ 
“ " " “ -0.0197 -0.0201 -0.0251 
constant (-0.57) (-0.59) (-0.84) (-0.63) 
A) Constrolling Pbwer 
、，，、 D , 0.346** 0.347** 0.352** 0.346** Var3)Relative_power (2.32) (2.33) (2.36) (2.31) 
B) Regional Governance 
Var 4) Govt一Intervention 
Var 5) Contract一Enforcement 
、 ， , � c . T , , -0.00771** -0.00739* -0.00855 -0.00756* Var 6) Foreign一Investment (.2.01) (-1.91) (-1.61) (-1.98) 
Var 7) Decreasing_non_tax 
C) Corporate Governance 
Var 8) b_h_sliare 
, , n � p « ^ n • . . 0.0711** 0.0708** 0.0732** 0.0717** Var9)CE0_.s_cha,r (2.42) (2.40) (2.56) (2.46) 
Var 10) indep_dir_% 
D) Firm Performance 
-0.0505** -0.0502** -0.0521** -0.0505** 
var l i j K U t . (-2.42) (-2.39) (-2.45) (-2.42) 
E) Interaction Terms 
ix. (var 4) * (var 10) 
X. ( var5 )* (var l0 ) 
. / , � * / 0.00836 
XI . (var 6 ) * (var 10) ( 0 ^ g ) 
• / -7X* / -0.00541 x n . ( v a r 7 ) * ( v a r 1 0 ) (。之呂） 
Adjusted R-square 14.75% 14.75% 14.71% 14.72% 
t-statistics given in paraitheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 19 Interplay between acquirer identity and other explanatory variables她 
To check if private acquirers have different attitudes towards the explanatory 
variables when compared to other block buyers, we add into regressions the 
interaction terms between the dummy control variable, Private—acquirer, and the 
explanatory variables. However, no significant results are observed. 
Model i ii in W 
“ - 0 . 0 3 3 6 -0.00163 -0.0235 -0.0226 
constant (-1.02) (-0.86) (-0.76) (-0.67) 
A) Constrolling Pbwer 
Var 1) AbsolutejDOwer 
Var 2) Countering_power 
、，，、„ , ‘. 0.364** 0.353** 0.357** 0.347** Var3)Relat.ve_j,ower (2.42) (2.36) (2.36) (2.32) 
B) Regional Governance 
Var 4) Govt一Intervention 
Var 5) Contract-Enforcement 
、 ， ， 、 p . T , , -0.00809** -0.00774** -0.00758** -0.00757** Var 6) Foreign-Investment (.2.07) (-2.00) (-1.99) (-1.98) 
Var 7) Decreasing一non_tax 
C) Corporate Governance 
Var 8) b_h 一 share 
” … P A . u • 0.0783** 0.0755** 0.0718** 0.0716** Var9)CE0_.s_cha.r (2.61) (2.48) (2.46) (2.39) 
Var 10) indep_dir_% 
D) Firm Performance 
-0.0508** -0.0509** -0.0511** -0.0508** 
Var n ) K U b (-2.44) (-2.45) (-2.45) (-2.44) 
Var 12) Profit_SD 
E) Interaction Terms 
. . , , , -0.00504 I. private * (varl) (-0.58) 
. . . , - 0 . 0 0 1 6 3 II. private * (varz) (_0 23) 
• •• . ^ / ’ � -0.104 
III. private * (var3) (-0.24) 
• /I� -0.0401 
IV. private * (var4) (-0 18) 
Adjusted R-square 14.97% 14.70% 14.70% I4.680/0 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 19 Interplay between acquirer identity and other explanatory variables""'' 
-continued 
Model V \ i wn 
“ ~ ~ -0.0304 -0.0297 -0.0210 - 0 . 0 2 6 7 ^ 
(-0.90) (-0.99) (-0.63) (-0.89) 
A) Constrolling Pbwer 
Var 1) Absolute_power 
Var 2) Countering_power 
� , , � D 1 0.356** 0.364** 0.345** 0.362** Var3)Relat,ve_power (2.38) (2.46) (2.31) (2.42) 
B) Regional Governance 
Var 4) Govt_Intervention 
Var 5) Contract一Enforcement 
、，，、！：>• r ^ . -0.00796** -0.0118** -0.00736* -0.00815** Var 6) Foreign-Investment (.2.00) (-2.20) (-1.90) (-2.10) 
Var 7) Decreasing_non_tax 
C) Corporate Governance 
Var 8) b_h_share 
„ n � r D A . ^ . 0.0769** 0.0820*** 0.0702** 0.0747** Var9)CE0_.s_chair ( 2 . 4 9 ) (2.77) (2.32) (2.60) 
Var 10) indep_dir_% 
D) Firm Performance 
-0.0510** -0.0498** -0.0509** -0.0517** 
var l l j K U b (-2.45) (-2.40) (-2.45) (-2.49) 
Var 12) Profit-SD 
E) Interaction Terms 
. * * / « � 0.0367 
V. private * (var5) (0 33) 
. . , 0 . 0 0 6 3 8 VI. pnvate * (varo) (1 � 
. . . , - 0 . 0 0 1 2 2 vu. private * (var7) (-0.30) 
. . . • . �� 0.0576 viii. pnvate * (var8) (0 72) 
Adjusted R-square 14.75% 15.82% 14.73% 15.14% 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 19 Interplay between acquirer identity and other explanatory variables""'® 
-continued 
Model V vi ^ Viii 
“ -0.0243 -0.0240 -0.0296 -0.0310 
Constant (-0.81) (0.463) (-0.99) (-1.01) 
A) Constrolling Power 
Var 1) Absolute_power 
Var 2) Countering_power 
、，，、„ , 0.360** 0.347** 0.332** 0.355** Var3)Relat,ve_power (2.4I) (2.30) (2.23) (2.39) 
B) Regional Governance 
Var 4) Govt_Intervention 
Var 5) Contract-Enforcement 
、 ， ， 、 D . I _ , -0.00797** -0.00748* -0.00778** -0.00813** Var 6) Foreign-Investment (.2.06) (-1.90) (-2.05) (-2.11) 
Var 7) Decreasing—non_tax 
C) Corporate Governance 
Var 8) b_h_share 
、 ， • u • 0.0685** 0.0721** 0.0779*** 0.0779*** Var9)CE0_.s_cha.r ( 2 . 3 0 ) (2.37) (2.71) (2.68) 
Var 10) indep_dir_% 
D) Firm Performance 
-0.0514** -0.0506** -0.0246 -0.0507** 
var l l j K U b (-2 47) (-2.40) (-0.80) (-2.45) 
Var 12) Profit_SD 
E) Interaction Terms 
• . , 0.0163 IX. private * (var9) � 55) 
.• -0.0182 
X. private * (var 10) jq) 
. . ‘ 11� -0.0478 
XI. private * (varl 1) ( 1 16) 
xii. private * (var 12) (0�^^^^ 
Adjusted R-square 14.94% 14.66% 15.92% 15.33% 
t-statistics given in parentheses 
* Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
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